America and the Age of Genocide

Samantha Power's 'A Problem From Hell': America and the Age of Genocide is a remarkable book. She goes through Armenians in Turkey, Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge, Saddam and the Kurds, Rwanda (which in 1994, given a country of just 8 million people, experienced "the numerical equivalent of more than two World Trade Center attacks every single day for 100 days), and Bosnia - each time illustrating the harms of U.S. inaction, as well as profiling the few brave dissenters and many silent onlookers. Regrettably, we already need a second edition of the book to chronicle the twenty-first century's first genocide, Darfur. The worthy and effective protests of SaveDarfur and others notwithstanding, America's reaction to this latest massacre has largely followed the script Power writes for all of her twentieth-century cases (Frontline recently broadcast an excellent history of the Darfur genocide entitled "On Our Watch", in which Power appears).

Though too lazy to provide a proper review of this rich work, let me share two passages which encapsulate Power's depressing thesis. First, from the preface, in which Power describes her fascination with genocide emerging from her experiences reporting from Bosnia for the Washington Post (xxi):

Before I began exploring America's relationship with genocide, I used to refer to U.S. policy toward Bosnia as a "failure." I have changed my mind. It is daunting to acknowledge, but this country's consistent policy of nonintervention in the face of genocide offers sad tesitmony not to a broken American political system but to one that is ruthlessly effective. The system, as it now stands, is working. No U.S. president has ever made genocide prevention a priority, and no U.S. president has ever suffered politically for his indifference to its occurence. It is thus no coincidence that genocide rages on.

After surveying U.S. apathy toward five genocides (each case featuring some gallant proponents of intervention), Power diagnoses the following framework (508):

In each case, the U.S. policymakers in the executive branch (usually with the passive backing of most members of Congress) had two objectives. First, they wanted to avoid engagements in conflicts that posed little threat to American interests, narrowly defined. And second, they hoped to contain the political costs and avoid the moral stigma associated with allowing genocide. By and large, they achieved both aims. In order to contain the political fallout, U.S. officials overemphasized the ambiguity of the facts. They played up the likely futility, perversity, jeopardy of any proposed intervention. They steadfastly avoided use of the word "genocide," which they believed carried with it a legal and moral (and thus political) imperative to act. And they took solace in the normal operations of the foreign policy bureaucracy, which permitted an illusion of continual deliberation, complex activity, intense concern. One of the most important conclusions I have reached, therefore, is that the U.S. record is not one of failure. It is one of success. Troubling though it is to acknowledge, U.S. officials worked the system and the system worked.

There you have it. The sins of comission - introducing desicive measures that could go wrong -are less politically risky than those of omission - simply tolerating another genocide. Inaction in the face of slaughter is the result of American political leaders achieving, rather than missing, their aims.

This is a compelling argument. Since elected leaders take their cues from individual citizens, we too bear blame for giving leaders more incentive to dither and obfuscate than to commit to humanitarian action. The Frontline Darfur documentary shows that outspoken individual citizens can indeed pressure their governments into taking some punitive actions agaisnt genocidal regimes. We citizens just need to get better at not waiting until hundreds of thousands have already died before demanding that our government do something. In other words, Presidents and Senators will only risk political capital saving the lives of non-Americans when the political consequences of inaction outweigh those of (inevitably risky and uncertain) prevention.

Another worthy point Power makes is that policy responses to genocide need not be a binary choice between acquiesence and "unilaterally sending in the marines." As U.S. policy in Darfur belatedly illustrates, there are a bevy of measures short of military intervention which can help deter perpetrators and protect innocents. Simply using the bully pulpit to decry the crimes and threaten the criminals can be efficacious. After stressing that the U.S. must share the burden of preventing genocide with our allies and relevant international institutions, Power enumerates a list of responses she believes the U.S. should direct toward every instance of genocide (514, paraphrased here):

publicly identifying and threatening the perpetrators with prosecution, demanding the expulsion of represenatives of genocidal rimes from international institutions such as the United Nations, closing the perpetrators' embassies in the U.S., calling on allies of the regime to use their influence. When warranted, the U.S can establish economic sanctions, freeze foreign assets, deprive foreign killers of the means of destructions. With allies, settin up safe areas for refugees, protected with peacekeepers, airpower, or both. Given the affront genocide represents to America's most cherished values and to its interests, the United States must also be prepared to risk the lives of its soldiers in the service of stopping this monstrous crime.

The last proposal in this list - endangering American soldiers to protect non-American lives -is bound to generate the most controversy. Yet all the items which precede it will in most cases generate widespread support. Rather than charting a policy of genocide prevention by trying to decide first on the most politically contentious issue - as is almost always done - we should pressure leaders to exhaust the full spate of non-groundforce measures, and only when necessary begin to deliberate armed intervention. In other words, we should not allow U.S. leaders to justify inaction in the face of genocide by claiming that the U.S. public "won't accept another Somalia." Powers astutely notes that "If everyone in government is motivated to avoid 'another Somolia' or 'another Vietnam,' few think twice about playing a role in allowing 'another Rwanda'" (510).

The same distortions from hyper-vigilance against "quagmires" afflict the American public at large. Regrettably, as Ron Brownstein and Matt Yglesias have argued, our media rewards journalists for stoking controversy rather than consensus. Thus, discussion of U.S. response to genocide takes its cues from cable news headlines - "SHOULD THE U.S. COMMIT GROUND TROOPS TO DARFUR?" - while largely ignoring less costly policy measures which nonetheless can be useful in saving lives. Until mainstream discussion of genocide prevention corrects this obsession with controversial measures - irrespective of their necessity at the time - public debate will fail to generate effective pressure on public officials. We don't start discussions of health care costs by asking whether we should have a mandatory age of death - why do we start anti-genocide discussions by immediately debating the use of ground troops? This is why a group like SaveDarfur has been so useful for keeping the anti-genocide ball rolling; its campaigns frame the debate in terms of concrete measures - economic sanctions against Sudan, divestiture, enforcement of a no-fly zone, deployment of U.N. peacekeepers - that can reduce killing without having to involve U.S. forces. One hopes the coalitions that comprise SaveDarfur will be a models for future activists.

Power is now a foreign policy adviser to the Obama campaign. Reading her book, as well as watching her on Charlie Rose, gives me only one thought - this woman must be part of the next Presidential administration. Perhaps as Ambassador to the United Nations with a potential promotion to Secretary of State, a la Madelaine Albright?

To grasp why Power would be a valuable addition, consider that too often U.S. policymakers have justified inaction to genocide with appeal to strategic considerations (what Power terms the "fear of jeopordizing" case against intervention). These have ranged from the disgusting - continuing to recognize Pol Pot's genocidal Khmer Rouge because Zbig Brezinksi and others wanted a counterweight to North Vietnam and China - to the merely misguided - such as in 2004-2005, when some State Department (and U.N.) officials warned that pressuring the Sudanese too hard on Darfur would scuttle Khartoum's acceptance of the recently negotiated settlement to Sudan's longstanding North-South civil war (a conflict unrelated to Darfur) - warnings that failed to appreciate how Khartoum was deliberately dragging its heels in regard to the peace agreement in order to buy time to finish the massacre in Darfur.

Power is intimately familair with these strategic justifications, and why they always fail to hold water. If America is ever to begin honoring its pledge of "Never Again,"giving her the President's ear wouldn't be a bad start.